This study examines the eect of section 601(a)(2) of the Jumpstart Our Small 
I. Introduction
This study examines the eect on community banks of the reporting, disclosure, and corporate governance requirements of registration under the Exchange Act. Banks and BHCs are required to periodically report public nancial statements to prudential regulators such as the OCC, FDIC, and Federal Reserve, and investors may obtain nancial data for these institutions from these regulatory agencies. However, registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) imposes additional duties beyond the periodic reporting of nancial statements. For example, the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regarding board composition, director independence, and auditor independence only apply to rms reporting under the Exchange Act.
An interesting question is whether these duties provide a net cost or benet to reporting rms. One way to test this would be to examine the eects of deregistration under the Exchange Act on rms that continue to report nancial data to prudential regulators. Cost savings or increased protability would imply that Exchange Act registration is associated with higher net costs for reporting rms. But merely examining rms that deregistered over a certain period of time would suer from a critical problem of selection: rms may deregister for unobserved reasons that also aect nancial results. If so, the cause of diering nancial results between registered and deregistered rms may be entirely unrelated to the Exchange Act.
However, in April 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Small Business (JOBS) Act of 2012 , Pub. L. 112106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012 , which modied the threshold for Exchange Act reporting for unlisted banks and BHCs from 300 to 1,200 shareholders of record. As explained in this study, the imposition of an arbitrary threshold permits utilizing the quasi-experimental technique of regression discontinuity because the location of banks and BHCs around the threshold is as good as randomly assigned (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) .
Banks and BHCs that deregister in response to the threshold change essentially constitute a treatment group in a natural experiment where treatment is assigned in a quasi-random manner according to the number of shareholders of record. Diering nancial results may then be causally attributed to the sole dierence between rms just below and just above the threshold: deregistration under the Exchange Act as a result of the JOBS Act.
While the results are not necessarily generalizable to non-bank rms that do not publicly report periodic nancial data, this study identies the causal eect of Exchange Act deregistration for unlisted banks and BHCs. This eect is directly relevant to evaluating the impact of the threshold change under the JOBS Act. It may also inform regulatory policy more generally regarding the eect of registration under the Exchange Act for rms that simultaneously report periodic nancial data to the public through other means.
II. Background and summary of the literature A. Legal framework
In general, while 12 U.S.C. 78l(i) delegates the administrative function of ensuring compliance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to banks' prudential regulators (Malloy, 1990) , banks and BHCs are subject to the same substantive securities laws that apply to other rms. Specically, they are required to register a class of securities pursuant to section 12(b) of the Exchange Act if those shares would be traded on a national securities exchange, which as of 1999 included not only the NYSE and NASDAQ but also the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (Bushee and Leuz, 2005) .
Banks and BHCs are also required to register a class of securities pursuant to section 12(g) of the Exchange Act if they have total assets exceeding $10 million and the shares are held of record by 2,000 or more persons, which is nearly identical to the threshold for nonbank rms. 15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(1)(B), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-1. Unless a rm undertakes an issuer self-tender oer or reverse stock split (Leuz et al., 2008, p. 206) , it has little control over the precise number of shareholders of record of its common stock because these shares are typically freely exchangeable.
1 Accordingly, section 12(g) makes the registration obligation dependent on a factor largely out of the rm's control rather than a voluntary decision to list shares on an exchange under section 12(b).
Until the enactment of the JOBS Act, banks and BHCs were permitted to deregister a class of securities that were registered under section 12(g) when the number of shareholders fell below three hundred. 15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(1)(B)(4). However, section 601(a)(2) of the JOBS Act amended section 12(g) by replacing three hundred with 300 persons, or, in the case of a bank or a bank holding company, as such term is dened in section 2 of the Bank B. Costs and benets of SEC disclosure and governance obligations A substantial body of literature discusses the costs and benets of compliance with the disclosure and governance obligations that apply to rms having a registered class of securities.
In general, investors will prefer that a rm go public if the marginal gains from obtaining disclosure and governance beyond what may be compelled contractually exceed the losses from the costs of compliance (Engel et al., 2007) . For a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic implications of public company reporting and disclosure regulation, see Leuz and Wysocki (2008) .
The 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) led to a substantial increase in compliance costs, particularly for rms with over $75 million in assets, as they are subject to extensive internal control obligations under Section 404 of SOX (Zhang, 2007) . These higher costs led many researchers to examine rms' deregistration in the wake of SOX's passage. Zhang (2007) nd negative abnormal returns associated with SOX compliance, suggesting that SOX imposes net costs on public companies. Engel et al. (2007) examine a sample of 470 going-private transactions from 1998 to 2005 and nd a greater frequency of these transactions after SOX's passage and positive abnormal returns associated with SOX for smaller rms with a high level of inside ownership. Leuz (2007) critique Zhang (2007) for high sensitivity to date specications and Engel et al. (2007) for mixing going-private and going dark transactions, where the former refers to rms that cease trading entirely whereas the latter refers to rms that remain publicly traded but cease to provide nancial statements as a result of deregistration under the Exchange Act. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) conclude that reduced compliance with corporate governance rules is correlated with higher abnormal returns. Hochberg et al. (2009) take an innovative approach by suggesting that the rms most likely to be aected by SOX are those which lobbied most heavily against its implementation, and conclude that these rms experienced abnormal positive returns.
Two post-SOX studies are particularly relevant to the present paper. Bushee and Leuz (2005) evaluate the consequences of the SEC eligibility rule, which subjected rms listed on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) to the public reporting, disclosure and governance obligations of the Exchange Act. They nd that over 75% of OTCBB rms which were not reporting moved to the Pink Sheets, and suggest this indicates that the costs of SEC disclosure regulation outweigh the benets (p. 261). Moreover, they nd these rms are smaller and less leveraged than rms which continued to report voluntarily, and the latter experience increases in liquidity. examine only going dark deregistrations by rms with fewer than 300 shareholders of record. Leuz et al. nd that going-dark rms are smaller and have poorer stock market performance, higher leverage, and fewer growth opportunities than the population of rms that could but choose not to go dark (p. 204). Unlike going-private transactions, going-dark announcements lead to negative abnormal returns on average. Leuz et al. suggest that even if the cost savings from deregistration are substantial, the going-dark announcement has an adverse signaling eect that explains the negative market reaction.
This important study shows the association between rm characteristics and the going-dark decision, but it does not permit identifying the causal eect of deregistration because of the presence of the going-dark selection eect.
Moreover, while the costs of SOX compliance gives every rm an incentive to deregister its securities, banks and BHCs that deregistered in response to the JOBS Act threshold change dier fundamentally from the rms in Leuz et al.' In another recent paper, Bakke et al. (2012) examine the eects of involuntary delisting from the NASDAQ using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, i.e., where eligibility is an instrument for treatment receipt. Their threshold variable is an arbitrary index constructed from NASDAQ listing requirements such as stockholders equity, market value of listed securities, and net income. However, this appears to violate the excludability requirement for fuzzy RD, namely that crossing the cuto cannot aect outcomes other than by inuencing the receipt of treatment, i.e., delisting (Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . Bakke et al. (2012) 's delisting index consists of the same nancial characteristics that are measured as treatment eects resulting from delisting. Crossing the delisting cuto virtually determines the value of the outcome variable, whether or not delisting occurred, invalidating the fuzzy RD design and making it impossible to untangle selection and treatment eects. As I explain further in section III.B, the regression discontinuity design in the present study relies on the external imposition of a numerical cutoshareholders of recordand crossing this cuto does not independently aect nancial performance.
Finally, in a very recent paper, Frankel et al. (2013) examine factors associated with bank deregistration under the JOBS Act. They nd that pre-JOBS Act size, more than 300 shareholders of record, and asset growth are signicant predictors of the deregistration decision. The size eect is expected since the cuto change only aected smaller rms and those with 300-1200 shareholders. They also nd that the stock price reaction to JOBS Act deregistration announcements is insignicant. Most relevant to this paper, however, is their examination of the accounting performance of deregistered banks. They nd that banks perform better after deregistration in the pre-Act period but the eect vanishes for banks deregistering after the Act and conclude that these results again reinforce prior ndings that deregistration before the Act is more likely motived by maximizing shareholder value than deregistration after the JOBS Act (p. 20). However, they acknowledge that these results may be possibly due to low power to detect any change since fewer observations fall in the post-Act period.
Unlike Frankel et al. (2013) , this study nds that the JOBS Act had a statistically signicant eect on the performance of deregistered banks that was largely benecial. There are several possible reasons for this discrepancy. It seems that Frankel et al. (2013) use a dierent sample than the banks and BHCs which were registered under section 12(g) and therefore eligible to deregister under the JOBS Act statutory change. They obtain a sample of banks that deregistered over the period January 2002 to October 2012 from SNL Financial. However, deregistration prior to the JOBS Act is fundamentally qualitatively dierent from deregistration under the JOBS Act statutory change: the former is purely due to self-selection whereas the latter is driven by the external imposition of a cuto change, leading to local randomization in the vicinity of the cuto. Similarly, including banks which are registered under section 12(b) would be inappropriate because that section mandates Exchange Act registration for rms which are listed on a national exchange. These rms were unaected by the JOBS Act cuto changethey are obligated to remain registered regardless of the number of shareholders of recordand therefore cannot constitute part of the population within which the assumption of local randomization of treatment in the vicinity of the cuto applies. Selection bias therefore confounds all of Frankel et al. (2013) 's estimations of the eect of the JOBS Act. As explained below, this study controls for selection bias by instrumenting the deregistration decision with eligibility which is as-goodas-randomly assigned in the vicinity of the cuto.
Finally, Frankel et al. (2013) measure return on assets (ROA), which only indirectly reects expense savings from the JOBS Act. Moreover, while they state that they do not distinguish bank holding companies from commercial banks in this study and refer them to as banks as a whole, (p. 11 n.7), the ROA measurement fundamentally diers between the two types of entities. Parent BHC assets consist largely of the equity capital in subsidiary banks, whereas bank assets are those of depositors. Similarly, the net income of parent BHCs reects intra-rm dividends and changes in equity capital rather than the direct interest and noninterest income and expenses which would appear on the balance sheet of subsidiary banks. By referring to SNL obtaining nancial data from the Y-9C (p. 11), it seems that Frankel et al. (2013) are calculating net income on a consolidated basis. But the ling threshold for form Y-9C is $500 million in assets, suggesting that Frankel et al. (2013) are omitting a large group of smaller BHCs which only report on form Y-9SP. To ensure that these rms are included, in this study I compare both directly registered banks as well as the bank subsidiaries of publicly listed BHCs, regardless of total assets. Frankel et al. (2013) take this approach with respect to the lending information variable (p. 11 n.8) but not for ROA.
C. Hypothesis and Qualitative Evidence
Particularly for banks and BHCs, the benets of the additional reporting obligations from Exchange Act registration seem limited. Investors already have access to nancial statements led publicly with prudential regulators, and it is not clear that the additional governance and disclosure obligations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exchange Act provide much of a net benet to smaller rms such as these, as the literature suggests. Deregistration, therefore, should be associated with cost savings and improved protability.
H 1 : Deregistered rms will have lower expenses, higher net income, and greater eciency their counterparts on the other side of the cuto as well as their own prior performance.
To verify my hypothesis is qualitatively plausible, I contacted the accounting and nance departments of several anonymous BHCs which deregistered following the enactment of the JOBS Act and asked whether deregistration led to cost savings. One individual responsible for accounting and nance answered in the armative: Community banks have had signicant regulatory burden hoisted upon them over them past few years and even going back 10 years with SOX, with no end in sight. Regulatory burden raises costs, which in a competitive market gets passed on to consumers in one way or another. The JOBS Act did lessen that burden for us. When asked specically about cost savings from deregistration, the individual replied armatively: Yes, legal, accounting, consulting, printing, XBRL (we hire a rm to assist us in this signicant reporting burden), internal audit, other including various soft costs related to preparing and submitting the SEC lings (i.e, my, our assistan [t] controller, our chief credit ocer, etc. time in that process here we are able to better use that time to work on productivity). 
III. Research design
A. Fuzzy regression discontinuity: Identication of the local average treatment eect for compliers Imbens and Lemieux (2008) summarize causal inference in regression discontinuity design using the potential-outcome terminology of the Rubin Causal Model. If Y i (0) and Y i (1) are the pair of potential outcomes for unit i, W i ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether treatment was received, and X i is a scalar predictor that determines whether treatment is received depending on whether the predictor lies on either side of a xed cuto c, then observed outcomes can be written:
For a regression discontinuity design to identify a treatment eect, the following continuity assumption must be valid (p. 618):
. If treatment compliance were perfect, the local average treatment eect may be estimated by the dierence of those conditional expectations at point c.
2 However, in the present study, the threshold change merely makes rms eligible to deregister their class of shares, but they are not required to do so. Indeed, not every bank or BHC with less than 1,200 shareholders deregistered after the enactment of the JOBS Act. Such imperfect compliance renders it nec-essary to utilize the technique of fuzzy regression discontinuity (p. 619). A comprehensive discussion of fuzzy regression discontinuity design is given in Hahn et al. (2001) . Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , the possibility of imperfect compliance is stated formally as:
This implies that the local average treatment eect with imperfect compliance is (p. 619):
This ratio may be interpreted as the local average treatment eect for compliers, which are units that receive treatment if and only if they are eligible pursuant to the cuto c (Hahn et al., 2001 ). As Hahn et al. (2001); Imbens and Lemieux (2008) ; Lee and Lemieux (2010) explain, fuzzy regression discontinuity is an application of instrumental variables estimation, with the randomized treatment eligibility as an instrument for treatment receipt. Accordingly, as with instrumental variables estimation more generally (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) , the assumptions of both monotonicity and excludability are necessary for fuzzy regression discontinuity to estimate a valid treatment eect (Hahn et al., 2001 ).
B. Inability to precisely manipulate the assignment variable
My study satises the local randomization requirement that banks and BHCs cannot precisely manipulate the assignment variable (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, p. 283) . As noted previously, unless a rm undertakes an issuer self-tender oer or reverse stock split, the number of shareholders of record lies largely outside its control because shares of its common stock are freely exchangeable among investors. and -0.3037, respectively. Accordingly, not only did no deregistering rm cross the threshold after the enactment of the JOBS Act, but the total dierence in the number of shareholders between the two periods was statistically insignicant.
C. Monotonicity and Excludability
My study also satises the two assumptions of monotonicity and excludability which are necessary for fuzzy RD and instrumental variables estimation more generally (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and Angrist, 1994) . Specically, crossing the cuto cannot simultaneously cause some units to take up and others to reject the treatment (Lee and Lemieux 2010, p. 300) . This is self-evident: it is dicult to imagine how the presence of any bank or BHCs on either side of the 1,200 shareholder of record cuto could have any causal impact on whether other banks or BHCs choose to deregister.
The excludability condition merits additional discussion. Lee and Lemieux describe this condition as: X crossing the cuto cannot impact Y except through impacting receipt of treatment (p. 300). It might seem that extreme dierences in the overall number of shareholders would aect rms' nancial performance, if nothing else than simply because of economies of scalelarge dierences in number of shareholders is likely a proxy for size.
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Moreover, the excludability restriction is that crossing the cuto cannot impact Y, not that the running variable is uncorrelated with the outcome. The use of local linear regression to measure discontinuity simply assumes that the counterfactual is continuous (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . The RD assumption is local randomization: crossing the cutomoving from 1,199 to 1,201 shareholdersshould have no eect on outcomes other than inuencing the receipt of treatment. Interpreting the LATE as a weighted average treatment eect based on the ex ante probability of proximity to the cuto reects the inherent limitation that any RD design provides relatively little information regarding observations that are far away from the cuto. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that moving from 1,199 to 1,201 shareholders would have any eect on nancial performance other than inuencing the receipt of treatment.
The continuity of observables test below is consistent with this assumption, as none of the pretreatment observables aect outcomes in close proximity to the threshold.
D. Comparative interrupted time series analysis
A novel approach in this paper is to utilize not only outcome variables at one point in time Indeed, the comparative interrupted time series method has been used in a variety of settings to provide a plausible counterfactual inference over time. Interrupted time series examines the eect of a policy change on a single unit's performance over time, whereas comparative interrupted time series includes the addition of an otherwise identical control group to strengthen the counterfactual inference in the post-treatment period (McCleary and Hay, 1980) . Recent applications in the literature include community intervention studies (Biglan et al., 2000) , medicine use research (Wagner et al., 2002) , and the eect of pay for performance on hypertension (Serumaga et al., 2011) . More recently, Somers et al. received a grant from the U.S. Department of Education to study the combination of regression discontinuity analysis and interrupted time series analysis (Somers et al., 2009 ) and have authored a working paper on related issues (Somers et al., 2012) .
My study is one of the rst applied papers to combine regression discontinuity with comparative interrupted time series analysis and obtain the causal identication benets of both. Regression discontinuity permits identifying the local average treatment eect of deregistration at the 1,200-shareholder mark, and the time series observations for both the treatment and control groups allow identifying the average treatment eect between treatment and control rms under the assumption that the control group is a valid counterfactual to treatment. This assumption is signicantly strengthened by the same property that enables the use of regression discontinuity: the imposition of an arbitrary cuto, which leads to as-good-as-random assignment in the vicinity of the cuto. I control for serial correlation across time within rms and across rms within each quarter by clustering standard errors by rm and quarter using the method of Cameron et al. (2011) .
In summary, it is highly likely that treatment and control observations in my study will be balanced on unobservables for three reasons: (1) rms on either side of the 1,200-shareholder cuto are likely to be identical in every waytreatment assignment in the vicinity of the cuto is as good as random; (2) The outcome variables in this study are ratios from the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR), which provides each income statement and balance sheet item as a fraction of average net assets for the reported quarter. These ratios are provided by the FDIC for the purpose of evaluating bank performance independent of the size of the total assets on the institution's balance sheet.
6 The outcome variables utilized are (1) personnel & other noninterest expenses, which is the sum of (a) other noninterest expenses, i.e., retainer fees, legal fees, audit fees, and other fees and expenses paid to attorneys, accountants, management consultants, investment counselors, and other professionals who are not bank ocers or employees 7 ; and (b) personnel expenses, i.e., salaries and employee benets.
(FDIC, 2013); (2) total noninterest expenses; (3) total pretax expenses; (4) total income; (5) net income; (6) eciency ratio; (7) assets per employee; and (8) capital ratio. A complete codebook is provided in the Appendix with the ocial UBPR eld codes.
In addition, the estimations use Shareholders of Record as the running variable, which consists of the number of shareholders at the time of deregistration for rms which deregistered or as reported on the annual report immediately preceding the enactment of the JOBS Act (typically December 31, 2011) for the other observations. As the number of shareholders of record is only reported on rms' annual 10-K lings, this reects the best possible approximate division of rms into eligible for treatment and control at the time of treatment, i.e., the enactment of the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012. 
where T = 1[X ≥ c], i.e., whether the running variable exceeds the 1,200 shareholder cuto and the observation is after April 5, 2012, when the JOBS Act was enacted. This reduces to:
where τ r = τ δ, i.e., the intention-to-treat eect (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, p. 328 While the outcome variables are implicitly adjusted for the size of each institution's total assets, including additional covariates should be unnecessary if assignment to treatment is as-good-as-random in the vicinity of the cuto. As noted by Lee and Lemieux (2010) , including covariates in a regression discontinuity design may lead to inconsistent estimates of [the treatment eect], and may cause the asymptotic variance to increase (p. 333 n. 44).
In general, the quasi-experimental design renders it unnecessary to impose functional form assumptions, i.e., by including a linear combination of covariates in the regression analysis.
However, as a robustness check, I control for portfolio composition in an additional set of estimations with covariates for (1) short-term non-core funding, (2) domestic and foreign deposits of banks in foreign countries as a percent of total deposits, (3) demand, now, ATS, MMDA and deposits below insurance limit less fully insured brokered deposits, and (4) other borrowing with a maturity greater than one year. As shown in the Appendix, including these covariates does not substantially alter the results, which is to be expected if assignment to treatment is as-good-as-random in the vicinity of the cuto. These gures indicate several discontinuities. Table 3 shows sensitivity of the results to choice of data window and lists point estimates of the treatment eect for individual regressions on the outcome variable at varying window lengths, omitting the running variable polynomial control. All of these regressions have standard errors clustered by rm and quarter to control for serial correlation over time and across rms within each quarter. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
As the UBPR income statement ratios are dened as percentages of average quarterly assets, the point estimates for income statement gures may be interpreted as the dollar eect of deregistration per $1 of average quarterly assets. To summarize, at a window of 900 shareholders, deregistration had a positive eect on treated rms, leading to a reduction of $0.91 in personnel & other noninterest expenses and $1.09 in total noninterest expenses per $1 of assets at the α = .10 level, and a reduction of $3.38 in total pretax expenses and an increase of $1.27 in net income per $1 of assets at the α = .05 level. The total noninterest expenses coecient is signicant at the α = .05 level with data windows of 700 to 800 shareholders. Nonetheless, as this coecient remains relatively stable throughout diering windows, it seems likely that there is a real eect but insucient data to overcome excess variance. Deregistration also led to an increase of $1.24 million in assets per employee, which is a measure of eciency.
8 However, deregistration caused a decrease of $2.35 in total pretax income and a decrease of $1.95 in total equity capital per $1 of assets. The eciency ratiototal overhead expense as a percent of net interest and noninterest incomeremained unchanged as a result of deregistration.
A 900 shareholder window reduces variance by using the maximum available data, while partially controlling for omitted variables bias at the ends (where treatment assignment is not necessarily as-good-as-random) through the number of shareholder running variable.
Nonetheless, these results are largely consistent with smaller data windows through 300
shareholders, below which there are few distinct cross-sectional observations.
The cross-sectional regression discontinuity estimates constitute the primary outcomes of 
IV. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The consistency of the estimated treatment eect across data windows from 300 to 900
shareholders suggests that the JOBS Act had a largely benecial eect on community banks which deregistered in response to the cuto change. As suggested by the literature and qualitative evidence, the benets of Exchange Act registration are exceedingly limited for banks that already report nancial data to prudential regulators. While the estimated eect in this study is a locally averaged at the point of discontinuityand thus applies to the entire dataset only under an assumption of homogeneitythere is little reason to suspect substantial heterogeneity among banks within a certain band of shareholders. While this study cannot directly prove homogeneity, it seems intuitively reasonable to suppose that a bank with 1,500
shareholders is not signicantly dierent from a bank with 1,100 with respect to the cost savings of deregistration, since these savings derive from the preexisting parallel reporting to prudential regulators that applies to all banks and is orthogonal to number of shareholders.
Accordingly, the results of these study suggest that Congress should consider raising the cuto further to permit banks and BHCs with more than 1,200 shareholders of record to
deregister.
An interesting question for further research is whether the cost savings from deregistration persist with non-bank rms. Those with over $10 million in assets are permitted to deregister under section 12(g) when the number of shareholders falls below 300. Unlike banks and BHCs, non-bank rms are not generally required to report periodic nancial data to prudential regulators, suggesting that the net benets of deregistration for these rms is less clear. Nonetheless, the results of this study do suggest that Congress should pass the Holding Company Registration Threshold Equalization Act of 2013, which extends the JOBS Act deregistration cuto change to savings and loan holding companies, as these do report to prudential regulators in a manner identical to BHCs.
Two puzzling aspects of these results are the fall in total pretax income and overall equity capital as a result of deregistration. Pretax income is particularly perplexing, as one would imagine that Exchange Act registration would aect expenses alone. The fall in total capital per $1 of assets might result from investors fearing potential reduced liquidity from non-reporting under the Exchange Act. However, as the decrease in total capital is not robust to smaller data windows, it may simply be correlating with an unobserved confounder at the larger data window which is correlated with rm size and not entirely captured by the running variable polynomial.
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the cost savings are likely to be greater in the future. In an interview with an anonymous bank, an individual noted that some of the Exchange Act-related expenses are denitely and distinctly realized in 2012 and some are yet to come (e.g., the eects on our insurance) for instance our full year of audit as a deregistered company has not been experienced, our XBRL assistance contract runs through the year end but we will not have any XBRL costs next year. Accordingly, the long-term eect of deregistration would be an interesting topic for future research.
Appendix
Bandwidth Selection Tests Robustness Check -Treatment Eect Estimations
The following table presents estimates of the treatment eect controlling for additional covariates for portfolio composition: (1) short-term non-core funding, (2) domestic and foreign deposits of banks in foreign countries as a percent of total deposits, (3) demand, now, ATS, MMDA and deposits below insurance limit less fully insured brokered deposits, and (4) other borrowing with a maturity greater than one year. The results are largely consistent with the results in Table 3 , albeit with some minor variations and loss of statistical signicance on the personnel & other noninterest expenses result. As noted by Lee and Lemieux (2010) , including covariates in a regression discontinuity design may lead to inconsistent estimates of [the treatment eect], and may cause the asymptotic variance to increase (p. 333 n.44).
UBPR Descriptions
The following codebook provides the ocial UBPR description for each outcome variable 5 However, in many of the estimations conducted in this study, the number of shareholders polynomial running variables were individually and jointly insignicant, suggesting that the number of shareholders does not correlate with all of the outcomes.
6 The income statement items are also annualized to permit comparing results across quarters.
7 While some banks report separate income statement items for legal and accounting/audit expenses, these cannot be utilized in the study because banks are required to report these legal and accounting/audit expenses separately only if they exceed $25,000 and 3% of the total category of other noninterest expenses (FDIC, 2013) . Variation between banks in crossing this threshold is non-random and thus highly problematic for inference.
8 The magnitude of this gure results from bank assets consisting primarily of cash deposited by depositors.
